No.48

<Life-worldly situativity and historicity. Situation as practical horizon. Homeland and foreign land. The vivid present of the life-world and its vivid past>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> Situation, tradition, practical surrounding world. Universal situation (“outer space”) all human situation.*

*From 4 <=page 544,25 – 546,5> on:*

*Basis for the description of the forms of the surrounding world: the iterative enlargement of the surrounding world (homeland, foreign land, iteration of the foreign land)*

*<Then> the task or question is: How do I arrive from my respectively currently constituted life world, or rather, < how do we arrive> at that world which is the theme of ontology, how [do we come] from the forms of the surrounding world and their description to the ontological world-forms – the world to which all positive sciences are related? But this question is not answered. There just remains the description of the surrounding world and its reflection on the history’s task and the exploration of the relation of all description of the surrounding world to man and to the personal human peoples as being practically related to their surrounding world, and as members of the same living, experiencing, acting, etc. within it.*

<§1.> Tradition, situation, practical surrounding world as practical universal horizon, universal situation. “World for all”, universal situation, the universal basis for acceptance

The fight against tradition, against the alleged self-evidences of “life’s experience”, which in truth is not self-given. It is always and in a complete sense a fight against the “situation”, against the sedimented acquirements of the highest mediate acceptances of being that have become “self-evidences”. That which is taken from the situation and which is pronounced is accepted with “self-evidence”, particularly if, as usually, it is a **[543]** common situation or rather tradition. Common situation is always the base of acceptance, on which the respective acting lasts, the single-human and again the common [acting]. Also where a community acts as a unitary personality, it has its situation.

But **situation** itself is something relative. The situation is the vivid horizon of interest, is the practical horizon of the acting subject; it implies all its practical possibilities and is itself the vivid and not yet uncovered horizon of acceptance, containing as potentiality all acceptances of being (including the acceptances of value) of the practical actings, designs, etc. of men proceeding within the surrounding world, which are implicitly expected, and to which is made recourse respectively, where the practical interest of the acting subject or of the practically considering subject motivates the actualization, that is, leads to awakening.

But the situation as this horizon itself stands in further horizons. Also, the horizons pervade each other.

Man, within the multiplicity of his practical interests, lives within a unitary practical surrounding world as his practical universal horizon, in which all special horizons, having been awakened for the respective typical practice in particularity, are included. But man is able to go from one surrounding world into the other.[[2]](#footnote-2) And men, living in a communalized way within a common situation, can also communalize with communities of other situations, of other surrounding worlds by enlarging their communalization. This is part of the historical process. **History is community life in tradition**, **that is, in a situation** as respective sedimented ground of acceptance.

Finally, all situations stand in a respective **universal situation**, and this is **the always pre-given world**. – The world “for all”, the all common [world] is the universal situation, the universal ground of acceptance for all, but not taken singly, but within the immediate and mediate communalization belonging to everyone’s life, insofar as everyone has immediately and mediately a community of living with everyone. World thus is the universal ground of acceptance, that, on which all find themselves as a matter of course within the togetherness, in actual and **[544]** possible encounter, the [ground] which all have as the common “historically” accrued situation – historically in the common sense, insofar as that history comes into consideration, which is related to the persons and the personally common tradition.[[3]](#footnote-3)

But if we speak of **world in “formal” universality**, and if we may still just assume our world, and I [may just assume] me? Indeed I also say myself: Everyone has his surrounding world and everyone has it as the [surrounding world] of his “we”, as that of his homeland, than [as that] of his people. But eventually I also say: The primitive man, the East-Asian, etc., has another [surrounding world]. I am born into my surrounding world, I have grown into its tradition like my home comrades. Of course I learned geography and history in school, I read manifold things about East Asia and I have formed my “conception” accordingly, etc. But it is still the base of the indirect understanding through information by “globetrotters”, or else by my own travels around the world, by communication with men of a foreign surrounding world, that my original world, my present surrounding world being all-temporally disclosed from present has an **ontological structure** which is itself invariable as such while I can conceive of the surrounding world as being changed, whether due to messages, or due to fantasy. My familiar world has its horizons.

<§2. Belonging to the invariant style of a life-world: separation of homeland and reiterational foreign land>

The ontological form of course does not stand out in a special way, and that part of what is occasionally standing out belonging to it like time and space is thereby not understood as something ontologically universal. But how can I gain cognition of what an ontological form is, and that universally such a [cognition] is to be singled out, I, having simply a surrounding world, and having indeed within the flow of my life and of its temporality an ever other but still unitary surrounding world? Also the **invariance of the style** is part of the unity. **[545]** Or rather: In which way ever memory offers me a present of the surrounding world, in the transition of one [surrounding world] to the other and to the current present, the **surrounding world is of the same type**; the apperception of the past in its type is necessary by way of the constant similarity. I thus initially gain only the concrete type of the surrounding world, e.g. that of my home-world. But I need to be more precise. Within flowing present, or rather, within the consciously continuous process of perception the same persists continuously as the “familiar” one; but then there is an inconsistency. For example, I experience my house, my village, my landscape within the flow of experience as something persistently being to which experience leads me back ever again; I live here and in repetition I return in an active way to these same men and things which remain or relatively remain, occupying with them now thus, now thus. Within this surrounding world I respectively move according to the occupations; and whatever I am doing, I have a spatial-real horizon as potentiality to be able to move into it, to make something distant become near and known, and to set goals in a familiar form, and <to> occupy myself. If I do so occasionally, then I see another village, possibly one seen in the distance, more closely <one> with new men, and I understand these men as “foreign men” not belonging to my home, as such men having this homeland as surrounding world. Thus I can understand the distance of the horizon as a continuity of home-worlds adjoining each other, but also as an open-endless nature in which partly men do live, partly do not live – or as city man [I can see] from my hometown the surrounding country, villages, cultivated land, again a village, then again a town, etc. I know this style from my experience; from childhood on I went for strolls, for long walks, I travelled, and thus I have got to know the surrounding world of my hometown to which I always returned. But occasionally foreign men came in and told of quite other lands, men, ways of living, settlements, possibly of a similar style with villages and towns, but <of <> a completely different type, or of deserts, seas, etc. Possibly I myself gained such experiences on my travels, in which the style of my surrounding world changes and it supplements itself mediately like a horizon. Additionally others, written messages, **[546]** letters, books, etc. which I understand and can change back in intuition – even if it is not my own direct experience. Within the endless open, undetermined horizon, the [horizon] of the unknown, I can now use my imagination, and conceive of possibilities of this world. Accordingly **my homeland and the foreign land** for me are separate within the enlarged world, homeland as mine and of the “circle” of my home comrades. This circle <is> determined by the “normal” immediate and mediate community of experience and communication of the persons which still needed to be described more closely: usually living within their town, within their village, in which all those doing that, have to do with each other immediately or mediately.

“The foreign land” is a foreign land for me and my home comrades, and it is homeland for the foreign men. With regard to the foreign land of course experience results in the enlargement in the form of an open multiplicity of foreign homelands, and the iteration: my foreign land, foreign land of the foreign men, etc. The meaning “foreign land” has the character of an iterated intentional modification. But how far does the iteration reach de facto? How do motives accrue to carry on with them within the “ever again”, and to grasp the relative and relatively enlarged surrounding worlds as depictions of one and the same world as presenting itself within all actual and possible surrounding worlds? The consideration which needed to be performed here ought to be clarified according to its right purpose.

I can set myself the task, to explicate in natural focusing the pre-given world, that to which all life activities of the men – of “us” all – are related, the world, which becomes the theme of all sciences, and [which] already prior to these is the world of a general life, and experience within this life. The task can already accrue from the requirements of a general cultural science. It is indeed a main part of the historian’s own respective sphere of tasks, to gain clarity, and also to construct in a scientifically descriptive way the respective historical surrounding world of the cultural epoch being thematic within history, or rather of its humanity. By taking for granted that the world in which men are living is one through all cultural ages of a historically unitary cultural humanity, but also through all cultures and human peoples – the one world, in which men are living, and which men in general, as “living”, **[547]** acting and suffering within it, are respectively conscious of, although in different cultural and historical modes -, one may ask, how the universal “of the world”, going through all “respective” surrounding worlds, needed to be characterized.

I now bethink myself of the fact that this question concerning the universality of the world as **universal life-world of men** is not the [question] as to the **true world** in the sense of the sciences theoretically exploring the pre-given world in its true sense, the sciences of the world pure and simple, that is, the “positive” sciences, but simply the universal of the world, being consciously accepted by men as being a matter of course in their respective life-present, in this life itself, and unitarily accepted through their whole life. I furthermore bethink myself that I, now as historian for example, can only disclose the historically past surrounding worlds by the help of which scientifically to be utilized means ever, from our historical present or from the concrete present time, or rather, life’s surrounding world of this time, in which indeed all historical work itself takes place as a life-activity of this time and within the surrounding world of this time.

<§3. Historicity of life’s surrounding world. The broad present as vivid present and the vivid past>

I am led further back when I engross my mind. First of all: This **our present** or rather its present surrounding world encompasses within itself different surrounding worlds. It is a flowing surrounding world and within flowing it continuously predelineates present, past and future [surrounding worlds], changing itself not only as such within flowing, although being the same “world of our time”, but while becoming new, [it is] emerging from the past [which is] vivid within it, like the previous [surrounding worlds] had emerged from the previous ones within vivid common memory (“like we lived it”, like we know it, like “universally known”). And in each phase it is a surrounding world of its present in this stricter sense, in which **acquirements of the past** have found their expression, <in which> so to say documented secularized past is present, like any product from activity, each machine, each book, each **[548]** cultural object having become temporal is there and is understandable to all as human product of a former producing. But not everything is a human product. Apart from human and animal expressions of life, emerging from man and animal, and as that being understandable, but having not developed in purposeful activity, not in a producing way (animal holt, excrements, etc.), the surrounding world has in each present also many things having developed by themselves, and not by human life, like the tree being split by a flash of lightning, like other known and understood changes through mere “natural events”, changes, through which a lasting, a persisting being has grown within the surrounding world, and is understood as that from life’s experience.

Also human-historically and natural-historically experienced persisting objects, which <have not emerged> in this broad present, in <that> of the memory community, <which> do not come from the now vivid history, which is present itself, in its having happened therein, <but anyway>, [which] are present within this historicity: thus the ancient buildings, the old parchments, the castle’s ruins, etc. apperceived as being historical. Simply by being ruined buildings, ruinous houses, mills, etc., or volcanic lava, etc., they pose the question as to their unknown history, and together with that [they pose] the question as to our unknown ancestors, to their life and acting unknown to us, to their unknown surrounding world and its course of developing and effecting, in which our world has developed from a historical continuity, the historically temporal [continuity], from human history, but also from natural history.

Then we come to an endless regress springing up from our life present, or rather, from our life’s surrounding world, the **“endless” regress of tradition**, the human cultural tradition, the tradition which lies within the cultivated and in general humanized (and animalized) surrounding world, and of the tradition lying within “mere nature” itself. Thereby it is always a matter of something human, of the human surrounding world, our surrounding world, and of the self-documented and historically to be uncovered continuity of the surrounding worlds having developed from each other, of the historical times being worldly filled in a concrete way, and correlatively [it is a matter] of our **[549]** mankind, of our human life as “mental life”, as operating, creating in our surrounding world, in any way acting, but also suffering, caring, planning, hoping and fearing, loving and hating, etc., in order to experience that which is ours, our ways, this world, which is the world for us, to apperceive it in an experiencing way and accept it, <and> <to> be affected by it, to be determined by it for each activity and personal passivity. How could another world “determine” us without being for us, i.e., consciously being there for us as being thus and thus, communicated, meant, with this or that world sense? It is a matter of **us and of our world as starting point** for the past worlds of past humanities and past acting and suffering human existences expressing themselves through it – and of past mere nature, which also as mere nature is for us now, or rather, uncovered in natural-historical way, which was the nature of our ancestors. With all that we spoke, all too one-sidedly, of the **generative connection** to be disclosed by us, and thus of the generatively determined historical world, going through the continuity of the surrounding worlds: Obviously also the historical unification of different flows of generations comes into question but as being discrete, as belonging to special disclosed ages (or the knotting together of initially separated connections of generations), and thereby a mutually emerging co-acceptance of the however just gradually and in steps to be disclosed understanding of the surrounding world of the one generative humanity by the other one. Thus the historical surrounding world of the one [humanity] is enlarged at last by the relatively understood historical <surrounding world> of the other. The enlargement proceeds from present to present, and through it into the pasts, possibly also through disclosure of one’s own human past by way of co-disclosure of such a connection having taken place in former present of the generatively foreign human peoples and of the renewed effect of their surrounding world, of their cultural products on our present (e.g. vividly present effect of the old Buddhism, Confucianism, etc. – not of the one of our Indian and Chinese co-present, being altered, but of the original one, having been disclosed by us in historical research).

If one moves back even further, then the issue of the surrounding world, or rather the <issue> of the world of living humanity requires an exploration **[550]** of the present itself in its immanent historicity, completely running within it itself, the word certainly understood in an unusual sense.[[4]](#footnote-4)

With which method do we have to describe this our present, radically, thereby to describe it in a concrete universal way in its individually typical being? We cannot wish to describe the individual in its individual acceptance (however describable it is itself in its most close individual set of types): the everyday individual objects of our surrounding world, their individual changes, multiple processes, etc. They are that which is interesting within random practice, but not that which is interesting in a historical way and disregarding a universal sense investigation into the cultural scientific-historical structure – that of historicity as we could also say.

Which kind of universality, of typical universality, is here in question? Well, we already said, that present is vivid within flowing; present changes into present in a flowing way, and it has changed in a flowing way, and the having-been-changed belongs itself to the wide present. The wide, **the broad present, the present time**, for example the post-war period, is vivid present for us mature men, and not just this very minute, this hour, this day, this year, but also this whole line of years since 1914, having its individual-typical closedness, contrasting itself for us within the even broader present, to which we, having lived it, can adjust ourselves to, the epoch of the new Reich, in which pre-war humanity and post-war humanity, and therefore also the one and the other set of types of the surrounding world contrast for us. **The time, being concretely filled, which is called “broad present” in this relativity, is a vivid horizon of acceptance for us**, horizon of that which is well known as being existent for us, of which we have free command, from which we take in freedom by way of recollection, or by way of questioning others who have been “present themselves”, where we ourselves have not, or by way of old newspapers, memoirs, etc., that which belongs to it, in which we all have a vivid share from our own original experience, from which also the mediacies have their sense and gain acceptance for us, **[551]** mediacies**,** which as predelineated possibilities in advance already count among that which this present is within the past belonging to it itself. And now it would come down to consider this broadened present in its respectiveness, in its present, its phases, flowing away stretches of present, and to grasp the **typically universal** going through it. But does this mean that which each hour as hour, each day as day, etc. has as something typically preserving itself in all changing of its temporal content? Obviously it is the identical of the world, which goes through the flowing change of times with its events, with its developing and vanishing, relatively persisting realities of the surrounding world. How can we bestow precise sense to this? How can we arrive at a descriptive cognition?

To begin with, it is not easy to make visible a just tangible, but essential difference. Man himself belongs to his surrounding world (we will not say here: the man, we say: the men, and thereby [we] first of all think of other men and then of us, everyone of himself). Man, as a person living in his surrounding world, bears a relationship to it, and persists within it. Or rather: Always bearing a relationship he is constantly striving to behave within his surrounding world in such a way, that he can thereby persist. Bearing a relationship is: being affected by the existing surrounding world, turning actively towards it, now being present oneself as Ego-subject (person). The form of the active being-present (“attention” is an insinuating but still bad word) has different modes, modes of different dimension. Modes of the “mind”: being sensitively attracted and revolted within the mind as modes of the striving (striving towards, striving away). Modes of the will as modes of the doing, of the passive doing, of the spontaneous doing, for instance spontaneously turning the eyes’ view towards something and then keeping the eyes stick to it (in a “mesmerized” way), to be distracted involuntarily, but not internally letting the object fall, to involuntarily come back due to the stronger affection of that which one had let go away – or else voluntarily, e.g. in the antagonism of both affections, <to be> “bound” by both initially, and to decide by choice for the one in a wavering way, to wish to stick there, enjoying it and striving for joy, <that>, which else happened in an involuntary way, now voluntarily performing **[552]** and by choosing, to approach the object, to experience it in its sides in such a way that the joy increases as a sensitively striving behavior, or, if every viewing, every approaching in striving experience does not result in a further increase, to then enjoy it in most possible assignment of value. This means only the **most primitive cases, but basic cases**. It is more complicated there where multiplicities, changing processes come into question in the same [cases], and [where] the behavior is not only determined by the intuitional present, but also by the vivid past, as a dark but still vivid affective horizon, affectively for the sensitively striving Ego being actively and passively occupied according to the will,.

<§4. Historicity of human personality. Modes of the further acceptance of something past>

An effective historicity goes in this form – that of the respective dark, but vividly affective horizons of the so to say patent life, the life within current behavior, within current feeling, striving, wishing, acting – through the human person’s life, and this to such an extent that the man carries his whole past, at first that of the respectively awakened circle of interests, within this personal life, as that [past] being vividly effective for him, and as that being together with his future by way of his ever new behavior, that is, also <together with> that which of old is already past, verifying itself at the same time and at the same time reshaping itself in a “correcting” way. The correction means a habitually reverting back modification of former behavior, of former personal statements, decisions, within their proceeding performing actions due to present statements, that is,[due to] new statements, especially [due to] those presenting themselves as “recollections”, as reactivations of former statements hitherto being furthermore accepted in a horizonlike-habitual way, etc. Within correction, more generally said, within the modification (doubting or changing into mere assumption, eventually straight forward into negating cancellation), the old statement remains conserved as memory; but its acceptance is modified, possibly [it is] completely rejected. Thus for example with regard to a statement of the will **[553]** in the form of setting an end or willing a means. An old will is not “done” due to its former actualization. It is still a statement for me, being accepted by me – if I did not abandon it under the title of the regretting-it, of the repenting-of-it, whether of mere decision (which was not executed – “luckily”), or of the action itself and the act.

On this base an essential peculiarity of the specifically human personality rests, namely that man – insofar as he indeed has grown to be a man, has gained the first maturity as person – lives within the will to a future, in which he, “he himself”, would constantly be and remain, in which he [would] “persist”, that is, in which he lives in a life-style, willed by him himself and performed through his statements and actions, which he would have to affirm, which he would never have to cancel.[[5]](#footnote-5) This implies: Within the course of life the past remains, apart from the single current affections, dark and possibly clear recollections, though concealed, but still in vivid awakeness vivid as horizon, and thereby changing from present and its statements, modalizing, nay constantly being corrected – even if is not expressly conscious simply as mere horizon with regard to that which has changed. We are speaking of the past as that which belongs itself to the present for the man actually being just within the flowing present, actually living, and [which] belongs to it as the one he adheres to, in which he finds himself as being the same he is now, as [being] this person.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**[554]** With my decisions I am the one who is decisive, and [I] am in my decisivenesses, the decisions in the other sense, not <in> [the sense] of the deciding, but simply <in the> [sense] of being decisive now. Insofar as I change my decisions, i.e. , in truth, insofar as I abandon my former decisions which are not lost as horizon and [which] are still valid, I have changed myself in this regard: I am not the same any more – therein. In a certain way I am continuously changing thus, necessarily I change my acceptances. (I am not talking of the change of the mental processes, of the activities and passivities of the stream of mental processes, but of the persisting acceptances, the persisting having-a-position, convictions, decisions, of the purposes and actions being further accepted by me, deeds.) One has to appreciate the essential necessity that without a correction of acceptance life would not be possible, even if it was just in such trivial forms that a thing, like I later have to convince myself, is otherwise on its back side than the front side made us “expect”. Natural experience is a flow of ever new institutions of knowledge, which, as being constantly afflicted with anticipations, must be a flow of constant correction. But our experiential life is not merely natural experience and in general, our life [is] not merely experiencing, not merely bringing to bear temporal “facts”. We sensitively strive, we are willing subjects. The acceptance as being something valued by us and the acceptance of the will are based on the acceptance of the facts; we bear a relationship to the facts (to that which is respectively accepted by us as fact) within our mind and will. The circumstance that all experience (experience of facts) is horizonlike, and that the horizon of that which remains open through the experience of the experienced is an open range of possibilities for us, results in that all practice eventually is related to its horizon of practical possibilities, more concisely, [related] to a horizon of open possible facts as those coming practically into question. The realm of the factualness – always that being for us, always accepted by us due to anticipation, **[555]** from fore-seizing acceptance – designates a realm of inevitable disappointment; simply not <that> is actual, the de facto actualness of which we counted upon in advance (within anticipation, being inseparable from experience). But the personal ways of behavior on a higher level, in what way ever they are affected by the disappointment with regard to the actualness, have their own ways of further acceptance and of the annulment of this acceptance, which are not touched on from this side. Nay, there is a new shape of motivated abandonment of an existing acceptance, an abandonment called “sacrifice”. This is an acceptance which will not be “cancelled” in the sense of that [abandonment] of an illusionary fact, or of one being annihilated through the process of experience, <an acceptance>, which cannot seriously be cancelled, which carries its indefeasible acceptance in itself, and which we can only “relinquish”, and have to relinquish in “contradiction” with another, new suchlike statement which simply shows its greater right within the evidence of the motivation of the “sacrificing”, of the relinquishing in original practical evidence. We encounter here the indefeasible structure of contradiction grounded within human essence as being practical (as having mind and will).

1. November 1931 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Thereby he is standing within the awakened unity of his professional interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Historical world for all persons. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Eventually further inquiry as to the vivid present. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. But this holds true for each circle of interests, for each layer of the personality (the job-personality, etc.) itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. We thus have, as we can say, a **double present and past**:

   1) The perceptual present of the facts being for us and the memorably reproducible past of all that, what actually existed for us – thus as experienced surrounding world with nature, men, etc. Also that which perceptually proceeds, or rather, proceeded as our own mental living, and that which was and is accepted within this mental living as actual, as beautiful, as purpose, as means, etc. is also perceptual or memorial fact.

   2) On the other hand we have present and past as Ego-subjects, as persons. Our present – we the presently being subjects, as being personal subjects – now also encompasses all the past acceptances, which still are ours, all those which, unbroken in their further acceptance, are still accepted by us, and [which] are at the same time characterized as being further accepted by us within the now. That is, corresponding to the situation we are in an attitude and personally active as artist, as fathers, as citizens, that is, in special personality, and correspondingly a surrounding world of interests is awakened. But always the job-interests <are> awakened in a conspicuous way. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)